On Friday, April 16, Thomas Schelling spoke at the New America Foundation at a talk entitled “Thinking Through the Thinkable on a Nuclear Iran.” The premise of the discussion was that, in his view, there was no real way of stopping Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. Therefore, we must think about how Iran will manage its weapons, what type of capability it will likely pursue, and the likelihood of Iran actually using a nuclear weapon.
Schelling was primarily concerned with whether Iranian policymakers have thought about the security of their arsenal. He noted that the U.S. was “disgracefully remiss” on nuclear security for more than 15 years, and noted that the issue of stockpile security was more important than ever. He wondered who would have access to the weapons, pointing out that China, for example, has restricted access to a small segment of the military. Schelling worries that so much attention is paid to developing nuclear weapons, little policy is being formulated.
Schelling noted that many Israelis believe Iran is pursuing nuclear breakout capability, an idea that many U.S. scholars also agree with. He noted that no one seems to know if this is truly the case, and wonders if Iran has considered such a plan. It might be possible to persuade them not to fully weaponize, but as Jeffrey Lewis noted, there are inherent problems between trying to persuade Iran not to pursue weapons, while at the same time offering guidelines for what would be appropriate should they develop weapons.
Finally, Schelling turned to what may be his most controversial idea, that there is an established nuclear taboo which would inhibit Iran from actually using a nuclear weapon. He believes that it is unlikely they view nuclear weapons as anything more than deterrence against nuclear and conventional attacks. Iran is unlikely to attack Israel or the United States with nuclear weapons due to the diplomatic isolation and retaliation it would receive in response. No state has used a nuclear bomb since 1945, and the strong moral aversion to do so within the international community has contributed to this nonuse. Schelling points out that the U.S., Israel, and Britain did not use them in both major and minor conflicts; more importantly, the Soviet Union did not use them in Afghanistan. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel without, apparently, fearing reprisal with nuclear weapons, because they recognized Israel had its hands tied. Iran’s leaders must be cognizant of this taboo, and breaking it would bring such strong retaliation it is unlikely they would do so.
